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Technical Appendix: Detailed Methodology 
 
CCEA estimates the change in number of insured, total cost, federal cost and state 
cost, where applicable, for each candidate’s slate of proposals as they apply to 
Connecticut residents.  To accomplish this task, we assume that Connecticut residents’ 
decision of whether to purchase health insurance and what plan to purchase depends on 
the price of a particular insurance plan relative to other plans and the purchaser’s 
household income.  We define the price of insurance for a household as out-of-pocket 
premium cost, excluding other out-of-pocket expenses such as co-pays and deductibles, 
employer contributions to premiums, costs of travel, and opportunity costs.  In doing so, 
CCEA does not estimate changes in total resource usage within the health care system 
based on these policies.  Therefore, the cost estimates presented here are actually lower 
than they would be were these other costs incorporated.   
CCEA develops models that quantify the consumer responses described above for 
each policy proposed by the candidates.  Estimates are for a ‘typical’ one-year 
implementation based on current Connecticut demographics.  In general terms, we 
analyze each individual policy as follows: 
 
1)  Establish baseline situation without candidate’s proposed policy.  In this step, we 
draw primarily on three data sources: U.S. Census Current Population Survey (CPS), 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) State 
Health Facts Online.  When necessary to account for eligibility across multiple policies, 
results from another of a candidate’s proposals may be incorporated into the baseline (see 
discussion below).  We use the same data across policies when possible. 
 
2)  Estimate how policy affects prices across different insurance types.  As discussed 
above, we define the price of insurance as the premium cost.  We use the specific policy 
definitions provided by the candidates to determine how these costs change following 
implementation.  In some cases, lack of detail regarding a specific policy requires us to 
make additional assumptions.  In this case, we draw from existing literature to determine  
2 
the most reasonable effects, holding assumptions consistent across analyses when 
possible. 
 
3)  Apply appropriate elasticities and take-up rates to price changes to quantify 
consumer response.  In this step, CCEA uses price elasticities to quantify how demand 
changes for a particular type of insurance as its price changes.  We also use take-up rates 
to determine enrollment out of the eligible when appropriate.  In both cases, we survey 
existing theoretical and professional literature to determine the most appropriate values. 
Whenever possible, we use consistent values across both candidates’ proposals.  When 
developing the models for each policy, CCEA initially considered a range of elasticities 
and take-up rates.  The models reported here represent our most reasonable estimates 
from this process. 
 
4)  Calculate deviations from baseline of the number insured, number enrolled, private 
costs, and federal costs.  In the final step, we extract from the model relevant results to 
include in the report. 
 
Because a single individual or household may be eligible for multiple policies 
proposed by either Bush or Kerry, analyzing each candidate’s policies separately and 
totaling the results would double count individuals and households eligible for multiple 
policies.  To account for this potential overlap among policies, CCEA determines which 
portions of Connecticut’s populations (if any) qualify for multiple programs proposed by 
either candidate.  We then use price information to determine how the overlapping 
population ranks its possible insurance choices within each candidate’s plan.  Based on 
this ranking, we run our models sequentially, incorporating the results from one policy 
analysis into the baseline for another, thus calculating the ‘net’ effects of a candidate’s 
entire slate of proposals.  This procedure is different for each candidate, however, as the 
details depend on the extent of the overlap among policies and the number of policies on 
that candidate’s platform.  By calculating the net effect of all of a candidate’s policies we 
implicitly assume that, if elected, all of that candidate’s proposals would be passed into 
law.  If only a subset of the proposals is enacted, our results underestimate the total  
3 
affect.  For reference, Table 14 at the end of this Technical Appendix provides detail on 
the current federal poverty guidelines by household size and age. 
 
Detailed Analysis of the Bush Health Care Proposals  
  We analyze the net effect on Connecticut of three policies proposed by the Bush 
Administration: 
 
Association Health Plans.  In an effort to encourage small businesses to offer health 
insurance, President Bush proposes legislation that would allow firms with fewer than 50 
employees to purchase health care through regional or national Association Health Plans.  
Association Health Plans reduce premiums by pooling administrative costs and 
increasing purchasing power.  In Connecticut, statewide Association Health Plans already 
exist.  The new element in Bush’s proposal is to exempt Association Health Plans from 
Connecticut state mandates on benefits, coverage and premium compression in order to 
allow regional or national plans.
1  Association Health Plans further reduce the insurance 
cost to firms of insurance by allowing insurers to reduce current levels of coverage and 
restrict eligible populations.   
 
Tax Credit.  President Bush proposes a tax credit for ‘low income’ households (see Table 
1 for definitions) who purchase non-group health insurance.  Current federal law treats 
employers’ expenditures for health insurance premiums for their employees as a business 
expenses, and thus they are not taxed.  Moreover, current tax policy does not count the 
value of such a fringe benefit as income to the employee.  However, a person purchasing 
non-group health insurance must pay premiums with after-tax money.  The differential 
tax burden imposes a significant additional cost on households that must purchase their 
insurance directly.  Partially addressing this inconsistency in tax treatment, the Bush 
proposal intends to reduce the tax burden for some households purchasing non-group 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office (2000)  
4 
health insurance.  Under Bush’s plan, households purchasing non-group health insurance 
are eligible for a tax credit according to the income and family-type schedule in Table 1.
2 
 




Bush’s             
Proposed Tax Credit 
One adult, no dependents 
$15,000 or less 
$22,500 




One adult with dependents 
$25,000 or less 
$32,500 




Two adults, no dependents 
$25,000 or less 
$42,500 




Two adults, one dependent 
$25,000 or less 
$42,500 




Two adults, multiple dependents 
$25,000 or less 
$42,500 





Tax Deduction.  Finally, President Bush proposes a tax deduction designed to encourage 
enrollment in Health Savings Accounts.  Health Savings Accounts, available since 
January 1
st 2004 through Medicare drug legislation, are only available to individuals or 
households purchasing high deductible health insurance plans (minimum $1,000 
deductible for individuals and $2,000 deductible for families).  Under the Bush proposal, 
individuals who purchase high-deductible non-group
3 health insurance and enroll in a 
Health Savings Account may deduct the total value of health care premiums from their 
taxable income.
4  The deduction is available regardless of whether the filer itemizes 
deductions. 
 
                                                 
2 From the U.S. Treasury Department, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2005 
Revenue Proposals, February 2004, pp. 21-24. 
3 Deduction is not available to households obtaining health coverage through their employer, even if plan 
qualifies for HSA. 
4 From the U.S. Treasury Department, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2005 
revenue Proposals, February 2004, pp. 25-26.  
5 
  To calculate the net effect of these proposals, we first determine what portions of 
Connecticut’s population would be eligible for multiple policies.  We begin by 
calculating the value of the proposed tax deduction for different household types at 
various income levels.  Using estimated high deductible premiums
5, we simulate tax 
returns for Connecticut households of various incomes
6.  Simulation results indicate that 
the “value” of the tax deduction becomes nonzero for households at roughly 200% of the 
Federal Poverty Line.  The tax credit policy, by contrast, reduces to zero at approximately 
the same income levels.  We therefore assume that the populations eligible for the tax 
credit and tax deduction are mutually exclusive in Connecticut.  However, the only 
eligibility requirement for Association Health Plans is that the individual work for a small 
business that offers such a plan.  Because those eligible for Association Health Plan 
insurance fall on a spectrum of income level, we assume that some portion of 
Connecticut’s population will become eligible for that type of insurance and either the tax 
credit or tax deduction if all three policies were enacted simultaneously. 
  When considering the household choice between plans, CCEA considers only the 
likely household share of premium costs. Because employers usually contribute roughly 
80% of total premiums, the households share of premium costs are always lower for 
Association Health Plan insurance than non-group insurance.  It follows that any 
household eligible for both Association Health Plan insurance and either the tax credit or 
tax deduction will favor the Association Health Plan policy over a non-group plan.  As a 
result, when we analyze the three policies separately, we analyze Association Health 
Plans first, and use enrollment results to adjust the baseline of the tax credit and tax 
deduction analyses. 
 
Association Health Plan Model Specification 
  CCEA models the effect of Association Health Plans on Connecticut’s small 
businesses.  We draw from previous research by the Congressional Budget Office (2000), 
Gruber (1994), Jensen and Gabel (1992), and others to estimate likely responses to the 
implementation of Bush’s proposed Association Health Plan legislation. CCEA applies 
                                                 
5 Estimated using QuickQuote.com for healthy 45 yr. old Connecticut male with various family types. 
6 Simulation by TAXSIM website: http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/taxsim-calc/index.html  
6 
the consumer responses determined by the Congressional Budget Office to 2002 
Connecticut Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data.  In particular, we assume that 
premiums for Association Health Plans would decrease by 13% but that non-Association 
Health Plan premiums would increase by 2% due to adverse selection.  In response to 
these price changes, CCEA assumes that some employees previously purchasing non-
Association Health Plan insurance would switch and that some previously uninsured 
would gain insurance.  Following the Congressional Budget Office (2000), CCEA 
assumes 20% of small business employees previously purchasing non-Association Health 
Plan coverage would switch to the plans (a cross-price elasticity of 1.538), and that 
enrollment in these plans would increase by an additional 14.3%, but 2.2% of previously 
non-Association Health Plan covered employees would lose coverage due to adverse 
selection (a demand elasticity of -1.1). 
 
Association Health Plan: Results 
  Our analysis predicts that federal AHP legislation would reduce the number of 
Connecticut’s uninsured by 2,869 (see Table 2).  Private costs include premium costs for 
all those enrolled in Association Health Plan insurance plus the additional cost incurred 
by those in traditional employer-sponsored insurance plans.  There are no federal costs 
associated with this program. 
 






(million) Federal  Cost
Results for Association 
Health Plan Policy 
59,667 2,869 $255.5  $0 
 
  CCEA estimates that Association Health Plans reduce costs primarily through the 
exemption in state mandates.  However, because Association Health Plans can offer 
health plans with less coverage, firms with healthier than average employees are more 
likely to switch to Association Health Plan insurance.  Through adverse selection, costs 
increase for employees in small firms who continue to purchase non-Association Health 
Plan health insurance.  In addition, allowing firms to bypass state mandates for coverage  
7 
could increase the number of uninsured who would have to find a Connecticut employer 
who does not opt for Association Health Plan or seek non-group coverage or go on 
Medicaid.  While Connecticut has more state mandates than average, we cannot say for 
sure that Connecticut would be disproportionately affected as far as quality of coverage.  
Different state mandates have different costs and affect coverage in complicated ways; 
quantifying these effects is beyond the scope of the present work.  For a comparison of 
Connecticut’s mandatory health care laws with other states, see General Accounting 
Office (1996) or BlueCross-BlueShield (2003) or Appendix II.  Under this proposed 
policy, CCEA predicts that small firms are, on average, better off than under Bush’s 
proposal through the cost savings, increased coverage, and healthier, more productive 
employees.   
 
Tax Credit Model Specification 
  CCEA estimates the impact of Bush’s tax credit proposal on Connecticut 
residents by constructing models simulating consumer response to price changes resulting 
from the tax credit.  The model uses as its base 2002 data describing insurance type for 
Connecticut residents, including uninsured.
7  However, we account for those eligible for 
both the tax credit and Association Health Plans.  The model described in the previous 
section predicts that 59,667 people would be enrolled in Association Health Plans.  Of 
these, 56,798 were previously enrolled in traditional employer-based insurance.  Thus, to 
calculate the net effect of both policies, we reduce the baseline number of people enrolled 
in traditional employer-based coverage by 56,798 to reflect that these people would not 
consider the tax credit.   
In constructing the model, we draw primarily on research by Gruber (2000) and 
Marquis & Long (1995) to estimate how Connecticut residents respond to the proposed 
tax credit.  Several responses are possible.  Gruber (2000) suggests that consumers view 
the tax credit as a price reduction in non-group insurance, and as a result, any of the 
following consumer actions are possible: 
•  Some previously uninsured purchase non-group insurance because the tax 
credit makes it affordable 
                                                 
7 Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts Online, Distribution of Nonelderly by Insurance Status, 
2002.  
8 
•  Some previously utilizing Medicaid switch to non-group insurance to have 
access to better care 
•  Many of those previously purchasing non-group insurance utilize the tax 
credit simply to reduce their cost of insurance 
•  Some previously covered through employer-based plans lose coverage 
because firms, recognizing that the tax credits make alternate coverage more 
affordable: (1) might drop coverage outright, or (2) might reduce their 
contribution to premiums, causing some employees to drop coverage 
•  If those previously purchasing employer-based coverage lose insurance for the 
two reasons above, they may switch to non-group, depending on relative 
costs, or remain uninsured. 
 
CCEA assesses of the likelihood of the consumer responses predicted by Gruber (2000), 
and we estimate the magnitude of this response as either a price elasticity or a take-up 
rate.  We assume that all consumer responses listed above occur to some extent, including 
the reaction of employers.  We assume a price elasticity of 0.4 to predict enrollment 
among the previously uninsured.
8  We further assume that the take-up rate from the 
Medicaid pool is 3.7%, and that take-up among those previously purchasing non-group 
meeting the income requirements for the credit is 65%.  We assume employers reduce 
premium contributions by 0.5% and that 0.5% of firms drop coverage, but that 90% of 
those dropped switch to non-group coverage and utilize the tax credit. 
 
Tax Credit: Results 
  Our simulation suggests that the tax credit would increase insurance coverage in 
Connecticut by 9,328 (see Table 3).  The component of the cost to the federal 
government generated in Connecticut in the first year totals $62.4 million.  Total cost is 
calculated as the total annual premiums paid by those utilizing the tax credit.  Note that 
the difference between total cost and federal cost is the private cost to individuals and 
firms.  There is no direct cost to states. 
 
                                                 
8 Marquis & Long (1995) provides a range of elasticities from -0.31 to -0.54  
9 









Results for Tax Credit 
Policy 
49,536 9,328 $275.8 $62.4 
 
 
  By design, the proposed tax credit policy would primarily affect Connecticut’s 
low-income residents.  Households below roughly 200% of the federal poverty line are 
eligible for the credit, and households at roughly 100% of the federal poverty line are 
eligible for the maximum proposed credit.  The model described above predicts a 
decrease in the uninsured rate and a net switch from Medicaid to non-group insurance.  
The proposed policy will indirectly affect the Connecticut State government, because 
Connecticut contributes to Medicaid, and because Connecticut incurs costs from 
uninsurance.  Connecticut will thus benefit from the proposed Bush tax credit policy.
9 
 
Tax Deduction: Model Specification 
  To predict the net effects of the proposed tax deduction on Connecticut, CCEA 
develops simulation models similar to the tax credit models described above.  As with the 
tax credit model, we adjust (using the same numbers) the baseline to account for those 
enrolled in Association Health Plan insurance that would not consider non-group 
insurance in conjunction with the tax deduction.   
Because Health Savings Accounts are only recently available, there is limited 
research on how consumers will respond to high deductible plans and Health Savings 
Accounts without the additional tax deduction.  The only empirical evidence describes 
response to the Archer Medical Savings Account pilot program (General Accounting 
Office, 1998).  This report indicates that participation in Medical Savings Accounts 
(which are slightly different than Health Savings Accounts) was extremely limited 
nationwide.  There is, however, some theoretical research on Health Savings Accounts 
that enables us to make informed assumptions in our models.  The American Academy of 
                                                 
9 See CCEA, “Uninsured in Connecticut: The Costs and Consequences of Living Without Insurance In 
Connecticut.”  
10 
Actuaries (1995) predicted consumer response to possible Health Savings Account 
designs.  Zabinski et al. (1999) and Goldman et al. (2000) each simulated market-wide 
responses to Medical Savings Accounts suddenly being available to large groups of 
employees.  None of this research includes the tax deduction in the analysis.  Only the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004) analyzes the tax deduction separately, 
reporting the results of a micro-simulation performed by Gruber (personal 
communication to Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). 
  Previous research suggests that the tax deduction will induce the following market 
responses: 
•  Some previously uninsured will take-up high-deductible non-group in response to 
the tax deduction 
•  Many of those previously purchasing non-group insurance will change their 
deductible to become eligible for a Health Savings Account 
•  Of those that increase their deductible, most will utilize the tax deduction 
•  Some healthier than average individuals and households will switch from 
employer based coverage to high-deductible non-group coverage to enjoy the 
lower premiums, Health Savings Account, and tax deduction. 
•  Because those switching out of employer based coverage are healthier than 
average, premiums will increase for the remainder in that group.  Due to this 
adverse selection, some previously insured through their employer will drop 
coverage. 
 
CCEA develops a model based on the consumer and market responses suggested 
in the literature.  As with the tax credit models, we use 2002 Connecticut data
10 as our 
base.  However, because the value of the deduction depends on income, we use Current 
Population Survey data to determine the fraction of each insurance group that qualifies 
for a nonzero deduction.  Consumer responses are applied only to these groups.  We 
assume households qualifying for Medicaid have incomes too low to benefit from the tax 
deduction.  More specifically, we assume a price elasticity of 0.1 to estimate the number 
of previously uninsured taking up high-deductible non-group insurance.  We follow 
Goldman et al. (2000) by assuming that 36% of those previously purchasing non-group 
insurance raise their deductible to qualify for the HSA, and that 75% of those changing 
their deductible use the tax deduction.  Following the Congressional Budget Office 
                                                 
10 Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts Online, Distribution of Nonelderly by Insurance Status, 
2002.  
11 
(2000), we estimate that adverse selection induces a 2% price increase in premiums for 
employer based insurance. 
 
Tax Deduction: Results 









Results for Tax 
Deduction Policy 
82,936 -749 $485.8  $79.2 
 
  Table 4 displays the simulated impacts of the tax deduction policy on 
Connecticut.  Federal costs are calculated as the average deduction multiplied by the 
number utilizing the deduction, and total costs represent the total premiums paid by those 
utilizing the deduction.  As with the tax credit results, the difference between total cost 
and federal cost is the private cost to individuals and firms.  There is no direct cost to 
states. 
Because this policy is a tax deduction (as opposed to a tax credit), the value of the 
deduction rises with income.  For example, the deduction has no value to a single parent 
with one dependent with $25,000 adjusted gross income per year because that individual 
pays no federal income tax.  The tax credit is most valuable to individuals and households 
in the highest Federal income tax bracket.  Therefore, those most likely to enroll in 
Health Savings Accounts and use the tax deduction are middle and upper income, 
depending on family size.   These income requirements also limit the effectiveness of the 
policy on increasing the ranks of the insured.  Only roughly 50,000 of the 350,000 
uninsured in Connecticut have incomes high enough to qualify for the deduction.  
However, because wealthier households are, on average, healthier than lower income 
families,
11 those enrolling in Health Savings Accounts and using the deduction will be, 
on average, healthier, leaving the insurance pools they left, on average, less healthy.  This 
process, known as adverse selection, causes premiums to rise for employer-based 
coverage causing some firms and households to forego coverage.  These phenomena 
results in a net increase in uninsured of 749, despite a high enrollment of nearly 83,000.   
12 
Because Connecticut incurs costs for each uninsured in the state, this policy will impose 
an indirect net increase in costs to the state government. 
 
 
Kerry Health Care Plan 
The following section analyzes the health insurance plan proposed by Senator 
Kerry.  His proposals include a small business tax credit, the stop-loss reinsurance pool, a 
Medicaid expansion, tax credits for the unemployed, ‘near-elderly’, and an health 
insurance expense cap.  Several proposals incorporate the Kerry plan’s proposed 
Congressional Health Plan, an health insurance ‘mart’ or ‘exchange’ based on the current 
federal employees’ health benefit plan.  These policies are more comprehensive than 
those proposed by President Bush.  The Kerry proposals enhance all major facets of the 
current health insurance system.   
  
I.  Small Business Tax Credit and Congressional Health Plan 
For firms with less than 50 workers, Kerry proposes a refundable tax credit of 
50% of employer health insurance premium payments.  To qualify, firms must contribute 
at least 50% of the total premium.  Small businesses’ employees would be eligible to 
purchase insurance from a national health insurance ‘exchange’ or market.  Modeled on 
the current Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, the Congressional Health Plan would 
spread risk and administrative costs over a broader cohort.  The Congressional Health 
Plan would increase competition among insurers potentially increasing coverage at lower 
premiums.   
 
Small Business Tax Credit and Congressional Health Plan: Model Specification 
In Connecticut, there are 60,755 firms with fewer than 50 employees (MEPS, 
2002).
12  Of these, 28,859 (47.5%) small firms do not offer health insurance to their 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See CCEA, “Uninsured in Connecticut: The Costs and Consequences of Living Without Insurance In 
Connecticut 
12 The official definition of small business based on the Small Business Administration (SBA) varies across 
economic sectors as defined by the North American Industry Classifications (NAICS).  This definition may 
be based on the number of employees or total revenues depending on the economic sector.  CCEA analyses  
13 
248,818 employees (MEPS, 2002).
13  Small businesses face higher insurance premiums 
because administrative costs and risk of health expenditures are spread over a smaller 
pool of enrollees.  In Connecticut, firms with fewer than 50 employees face average 
premiums costing $256 more than firms face with more than 50 employees on average 
(MEPS, 2002).  The Congressional Health Plan and tax credit addresses this disparity.     
  Through the Congressional Health Plan, market competition reduces health 
insurance premiums between 1.5% and 10%.
14  These savings result from increased 
efficiency in the health insurance market (Enthoven, 2003).  The tax credit could further 
reduce employer payments for premiums by 25% to 50%, depending on the employer’s 
contribution.  Employers paying the minimum 50% contribution would receive a rebate 
equal to 25% of the health insurance premium.  Employers paying100% of the premium 
would receive a rebate of 50% of the health insurance premium.  The federal 
government would fund the tax credit. 
This program attracts firms that currently offer insurance, as well as firms that do 
not (Conwell and Short, 2001).  For comparability with the Bush plan, the scenario 
presented below uses assumptions from the CBO (2002) analysis of Association Health 
Plans and Health Marts.  Employees, and thus firms, switch plans with a cross-price 
elasticity of 0.4.  New employees gain coverage based on an average price elasticity of   
-1.1.
15   
CCEA performed sensitivity analysis using Hadley and Reschovsky (2002) and 
Gruber and Lettau (2000) who found firms newly offer insurance with price elasticities 
ranging from -0.31 to -0.54.  Of employees newly offered insurance, take-up rates 
ranged between 41% (based on Hadley and Reschovsky, 2002) and 76.4% (based on 
MEPS, 2002).  Abraham, et al. (2002) found cross-price elasticities between 0.02 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
uniformly rely on the small business definition of less than 50 employees.  This definition harmonizes with 
the available literature and data.  
13 These numbers compare to 99% of Connecticut firms with more than 50 workers offering health 
insurance to at least some of their workers (that is, 16,545 firms). 
14 Cost reductions are based on differences between FEHB premiums and MEPS employer-based 
premiums.  In its current form the FEHB does not offer intermediate sized coverage for ‘single plus one’ 
groups.  Individuals in this category would need to purchase more expensive family coverage.  In this case, 
average premium costs would fall by 1.5%.  If the Congressional Health Plan includes a ‘single plus one’ 
option, average premium costs could fall by 10%.    
14 
0.32 for employees switching health insurance plans.  The scenario presented below is 
moderate but slightly higher than these scenarios.   
The CCEA scenario presented below assumes a conservative reduction in health 
insurance premiums but a more generous response by workers and firms.  This analysis’ 
assumptions appear below: 
•  1.5% reduction in average premiums; 
•  25% tax credit; 
•  -1.1 price elasticity with respect to the expansion of coverage;  
•  0.4 cross-price elasticity for individuals to switch insurance; 
•   there are an average of 1.345 enrollees per employee based on MEPS 2002 data. 
 
Small Business Tax Credit and Congressional Health Plan: Results 
The small business tax credit and Congressional Health Plan increases the number 
of insured by 70,722 in Connecticut.  A total of 96,440 employees and family members 
enroll in Connecticut.  This represents 12,153 participating firms and 8,912 firms newly 
offering insurance (10% increase).  There is no direct state liability. 
  









Results for Small 
Business Tax Credit and 
Congressional Health 
Plan 
96,440 70,722 $325.3 $108.3 
 
  By improving small businesses’ access to affordable health insurance, this 
program insures small business employees, their spouses and their children.  The total 
cost of health insurance premiums is $433.4 million with the federal government 
absorbing $108.3 million of those costs (based on firms contributing 50% of the 
premium).  Employers and employees share the remainder of the costs.  
The assumptions underlying this estimate are comparable with the Bush 
Association Health Plan analysis.  This scenario conservatively estimates the potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 This price elasticity is slightly lower than the -1.58 assumed in the Association Health Plan analysis 
because this represents all employees – both those with high and low medical costs.  The Association 
Health Plan analysis selects only those with low medical costs who are more responsive to price.   
15 
increase in efficiency from the new Congressional Health Plan.  The Congressional 
Health Plan reduces the discrepancy in health insurance premiums between large 
employers (large purchasing groups) and small employers (small purchasing groups).  
This plan increases competition among insurers, spreads administrative costs and health 
care cost risks over larger groups.  In this scenario, CCEA assumes a 1.5% reduction in 
health insurance premiums from these efficiency gains.
16  To this extent, these findings 
represent an underestimate of the potential numbers of enrollees and costs. 
 
II. Stop-Loss  Reinsurance  Pool 
Under the stop-loss reinsurance pool, the federal government would act as a re-
insurer for employer-based health insurance for up to 75% of the health care costs 
insureds incur above $50,000.
17  This would reduce the cost of health insurance to 
employers by 10% (HR Policy Association, 2004, Thorpe, 2004).  In exchange for these 
payments, firms must meet three conditions:   
(1) employers must cover all workers in their firms;
18  
(2) employers must encourage the introduction of disease management
19 programs; and  
(3) employers must demonstrate how they will share the savings from these programs 
with workers.  
 
  Firms of any size would be eligible to participate in the stop-loss reinsurance 
pool.  The stop-loss payments would effectively reduce insurance costs to employers and 
                                                 
16 CCEA estimated premium reductions by comparing employer premiums in the federal employees benefit 
plan and the MEPS, 2002 data.  The premiums for single insurance are 10% lower in the federal employees 
benefit plan than the average for small businesses according to MEPS, 2002.  However, the difference in 
the weighted average of plans is 1.5%.  The federal employees’ health benefit plan does not offer the 
intermediate health insurance category ‘single plus one’ and these purchasers would have to pay a higher 
premium to maintain the same level of coverage.      
17 The threshold above which costs are paid would be variable and set to achieve a 10% premium reduction 
target.  For instance, Thorpe (2004) and others have estimated a threshold of $36,000 would be needed for 
the first year to reach the 10% premium reduction target.  
18 It is not clear whether this includes part-time workers, early retirees, etc.  (HR Policy Association, 2004) 
For the purposes of this analysis, we follow Thorpe (2004) by including part time workers at pro-rated 
support and exclude early retirees.  
19 The term ‘disease management’ is an umbrella term that incorporates very different types of programs.  
The Kerry plan does not specify what type of disease management programs would be implemented.  To 
estimate cost savings, CCEA models potential cost savings based on state level experiences in Washington, 
and Florida, which mandated cost savings in contracts with private disease management companies.  These 
programs target individuals with specific chronic illnesses, like congestive heart failure, diabetes, etc. and 
encourage the use of best practice treatment standards for patients and their physicians alike.     
   
16 
employees.  These reductions would be mitigated by the increased costs of covering more 
employees and disease management program expenditures.  The Kerry proposal does not 
detail the disease management programs.  Effective disease management programs can 
improve health outcomes and potentially reduce overall health care costs (see the disease 
management section below).  This policy is a broad-based program designed to make 
insurance more affordable to employers and expand coverage.   
 
Stop-Loss Reinsurance Pool: Model Specification 
About 68% or 2.3 million Connecticut residents receive health insurance through 
employer-based group health insurance (CPS, 2004).  These workers represent 62.4% of 
Connecticut firms who offer health insurance to 73% their workers (MEPS, 2002).  
Ineligible workers may be part-time, temporary or new employees.  Different size firms 
offer insurance to different degrees.  For example, all firms in Connecticut with 1,000 
workers or more offer health insurance.  However, only 66% of their workers are eligible 
for insurance.  Rising health insurance premiums have led to reductions in the numbers of 
eligible workers. 
The stop-loss reinsurance reimbursement threshold would be set to guarantee a 
10% reduction in premiums.  For firms with fewer than 50 employees, this is a smaller 
premium reduction than they could receive through participating in the small business tax 
credit and Congressional Health Plan.  CCEA assumes that firms with less than 50 
employees would participate in that plan rather than the stop-loss reinsurance pool.   
Other firms would either switch from their current plan or newly offer insurance 
depending on the total price change.  Firms newly offering insurance would be attracted 
to the 10% decrease in premiums.  Firms joining the stop-loss reinsurance pool would 
balance the premium reductions with the costs of expanding coverage to previously 
ineligible employees.
20  
According to the most recent Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), all 
firms with more than 100 employees in Connecticut already offer insurance to at least 
some of their employees.  Hadley and Reschovsky (2002) and Gruber and Lettau (2000) 
estimate that firms with less than 100 employees have price-elasticities of offering 
                                                 
20 The CCEA analysis includes all workers, including part-time workers, in the expanded eligibility.    
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insurance between -0.54 and -0.617 depending on their size.  The scenario presented 
below uses Gruber and Lettau’s (2000) estimate of -0.617 for firms with under 100 
workers.   
CCEA models a firm’s decision to switch to the stop-loss reinsurance pool two 
ways.  First, using a combination of data from the Economic Census and Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey, CCEA estimates cost savings for firms receiving a 10% 
premium reduction but expanding insurance to all full and part-time employees.
21  Firms 
that receive a net savings join the stop-loss reinsurance pool.   
As a check on this method, CCEA uses Connecticut-specific estimates of net 
savings by firm size produced by Thorpe (2004) and accepted by the Kerry campaign as 
an accurate characterization of their program.
22  Cost savings range from 5% for firms 
with fewer than 100 workers to 16% for firms with 500-999 workers.  CCEA applies a 
price elasticity of spending
23 by firm size to these savings based on Gruber and Lettau 
(2000).  The price elasticities of spending are -0.15 for firms with less than 100 workers, 
-0.72 for firms with 100-999 employees and -1.13 for firms with more than 1,000 
employees.  The scenario below reports these results.
24 
In firms newly offering insurance or firms expanding coverage, CCEA considers 
take-up rates from 41% to 76.4%.  In the scenario presented below, 41% of employees at 
small firms (fewer than 100 workers) take up newly offered insurance.  This estimate is 
based on Hadley and Reschovsky (2002).  They estimate 59% of uninsured employees at 
small businesses have health insurance from another source (Hadley and Reschovsky, 
2002).  At firms with more than 100 workers, employees take up insurance 76.4% of the 
time.  This rate comes from the most recent Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data.  
  To summarize, CCEA models use the following assumptions: 
•  health insurance premiums fall by 10%; 
•  the price elasticity of offer is -0.617 for firms not currently offering insurance 
(Gruber and Lettau, 2000); 
                                                 
21 Employers pro-rate contributions to part-time employee health insurance premiums by 50% on average.  
22 The Kerry-Edwards campaign has accepted Thorpe’s (2004) analysis as an accurate estimate of the 
national costs of their suggested reforms. See the Kerry-Edwards campaign at 
http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/news/news_2004_0402.html. 
23 Gruber and Lettau (2000) estimate how much a firm who already offers insurance will change its 
spending on health insurance coverage given and change in the premium cost of insurance. 
24 Using aggregate data, the CCEA analysis of cost savings for firms was lower than Thorpe’s projections.  
This difference is possibly the result of the higher level of aggregation in our analysis.    
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•  firms currently offering insurance face cost savings based on Thorpe (2004); and 
•  price elasticities of spending for firms currently offering insurance range from -0.15 
to -1.13 with an overall value of -0.66 from Gruber and Lettau (2000).  
 
Stop-Loss Reinsurance Pool Model: Results 
The stop-loss reinsurance pool would increase the number of insured by 88,263 
and enroll 204,692 employees and their families in Connecticut.  The federal cost of 
Connecticut’s program is $90.8 million.  Employers and employees absorb the remaining 
$816.7 million in health insurance premium costs.  The state has no direct liability under 
this program. 
  









Results for Stop-Loss 
Reinsurance Pool  
204,692 88,263  $816.7  $90.8 
 
Based on CCEA’s net analysis, this program increases coverage primarily by 
increasing the number of eligible employees.  A total of 2,182 firms participate in the 
program but only 164 firms newly offer insurance in Connecticut.  These numbers reflect 
the fact that larger firms in Connecticut already offer insurance and firms with less than 
50 employees are more likely to choose the small business tax credit option because it 
reduces costs to the firms more than this program.    
This program expands the employer-based health insurance system using federal 
payments to reduce the price of health insurance premiums and mandating coverage 
increases.  Although the Kerry plan specifies that firms must detail how they will share 
these savings with their employees, the plan does not explicitly determine who will 
receive what portion of these cost savings.  The disease management program 
requirement can mean vastly different things both in the nature of the programs and 
potential cost savings.  Health outcomes may be improved both through the disease 
management initiative and the decrease in uninsured.  Overall, it is difficult to quantify 
the extent to which this program reduces health insurance costs, increasing efficiency, 
rather than shifting costs through the federal payments.  It does, however, insure 25% of 
Connecticut’s 357,000 uninsured residents.   
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III.  Medicaid Expansion  
Kerry proposes to increase the number of ‘low-income’ persons eligible for 
Medicaid coverage by expanding the income guidelines for enrollment as follows: 
•  children younger than 19 in households with incomes less than 300% of poverty 
would be eligible for enhanced Medicaid (S-CHIP) [HUSKY]; 
•  ‘parents’ of children younger than 19 with household incomes under 200% of poverty 
would be eligible for enhanced Medicaid, (S-CHIP) [HUSKY] ; and, 
•  childless adults with household incomes under 100% of poverty would be eligible for 
Medicaid. 
 
  Kerry proposes to fund these changes through a ‘cost swap’.  The federal 
government assumes the full cost of HUSKY A for children, and 65% of the costs of 
insuring parents (Kerry, Edwards, 2004).  The states pay the costs of ‘expanding’ health 
insurance to children with family incomes under 300% of poverty (enhanced Medicaid), 
and states pay 35% of the costs of insuring parents with household incomes under 200% 
of poverty and the cost of insuring childless adults with household income less than 
100% of poverty.   
The Kerry plan would also increase enrollment by easing current restrictions.  
Allowing enrollment through schools, hospitals, and clinics would reduce barriers to 
enrolling.  Kerry would also eliminate the five-year eligibility-waiting period currently 
required for legal immigrants.  States that meet 95% enrollment targets would share in a 
potential $5 billion incentive pool.
25 
 
Medicaid Expansion: Model Specification 
Currently in Connecticut, individuals in ‘low-income’ households (see Table 7 
below) are eligible for government assistance through Medicaid, Healthcare for 
UninSured Kids and Youth (HUSKY), or State Administered General Assistance 
(SAGA).  The HUSKY A and B plans provide free or low-cost comprehensive health 
care
26 to children and their parents based on household income.  HUSKY Plus provides 
                                                 
25 Details based on Kerry, J. and Edwards, J. (2004) “John Kerry’s Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to 
Every American” http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/health_care/health_care.html 
26 Comprehensive benefits package includes: “preventive care, outpatient physician visits, prescription 
medicines, in-patient hospital and physician services, outpatient surgical facility services, mental health and 
substance abuse services, short-term rehabilitation and physical therapy, skilled nursing services, home 
health care, hospice care, diagnostic x-ray and laboratory services, emergency care, durable medical  
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additional coverage for children with special physical or behavioral needs.  SAGA 
provides health care coverage to ‘very low-income’ households. 
 
Table 7:  Eligibility Guidelines for Connecticut HUSKY, and SAGA Programs 




– under 19  
•  children with household income <185% FPL  
•  parents of children with household income 
<100% FPL 
•  pregnant women with household income 
<185% FPL 
302,899 
HUSKY B  •  children with household income <235% of FPL 
•  children in households with incomes 235-300% 
FPL, but pay $30 per month per child up to $50 
per household 
13,860 
HUSKY B  •  children in households with incomes >300% of 
FPL, but pay full premium, $158-230 per 
month depending on plan selected 
538 
SAGA  •  single adult in one-person households with less 
than 60% FPL if not working and 79% FPL if 
working
3 
•  single adult in two-person household with  
household income less than 61% FPL if not 
working and 76% FPL if working
3 
29,586 
1 These eligibility guidelines are generalizations.  Eligibility in specific cases is determined by the 
Connecticut Department of Social Services. 
2 Source:  Connecticut Department of Social Services, Aug. 5, 2004 statistics 
 
Connecticut already offers insurance to children with household incomes less than 
300% of poverty, parents up to 100% of poverty and general assistance to childless adults 
with household incomes below 60% to 76% depending on household and work status.  
Consequently, 53,210 Connecticut adults would be newly eligible for Medicaid under 
these proposals.
27   
In the absence of details, CCEA assumes the current premium-cost sharing 
arrangements for children in HUSKY B and no premium cost-sharing for newly eligible 
adults.  CCEA assumes that Medicaid-eligible individuals would prefer Medicaid to 
                                                                                                                                                 
equipment, eye care and hearing exams, and dental care.” (Connecticut Department of Social Services, 
2004, p. 4). 
27 This number excludes SAGA and Medicare eligible. CCEA assumes that Connecticut does not 
harmonize its SAGA program with this new initiative.  If the state did, CCEA predicts an additional 18,000 
enrollees under age 65 in the Medicaid expansion.    
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purchasing non-group insurance, which involves substantial household insurance 
premium costs.  Cutler and Gruber (1995) note that, in fact, Medicaid is not necessarily 
individual’s first choice because Medicaid involves out-of-pocket costs, is not accepted 
by some health care providers, and carries the stigma of receiving public assistance.  
Even so, CCEA assumes those who currently have no insurance are not willing to 
purchase non-group insurance and would prefer the Medicaid plan.     
The last major expansions in Medicaid (1986-1992) provide a basis for projecting 
the effects of the proposed Medicaid expansion.  Four major studies of the earlier 
expansions found that 24-25% of newly eligible children actually enrolled in the 
expanded Medicaid program nationally.  Cutler and Gruber (1995) and Shore-Sheppard 
(1995) found roughly 31% of new Medicaid enrollees switched from other forms of 
private insurance reducing the net gain in newly insured.  Using another method 
(difference-in-difference), Yazici and Kaestner (1998) and Dubay and Kenney (1996) 
estimate an average of 14.5% of new enrollees switched from private insurance to public 
(government-provided) insurance.  These switches include individuals whose employers 
dropped coverage or increased employee premium payments in response to the Medicaid 
expansion.  More recently, Cunningham (2003) found a national 64% Medicaid take-up 
rate among the uninsured in areas of generally high health insurance rates.  Although 
more optimistic, Cunningham (2003) does not account for secondary effects in other 
insurance markets.    
CCEA follows Yazici and Kaestner (1998) estimating that: 
•  25% of newly eligible take up Medicaid;  
•  13.5% of these individuals previously had insurance and are netted out of estimates;  
•  CCEA assumes the cost per new enrollee is the current average cost per enrollee in 
the HUSKY A & B programs ($2291.35);
28  
•  federal government pays 65% of the costs of insuring parents; and  
•  state government pays 35% of the costs of insuring parents and 100% of the costs of 
insuring newly eligible childless adults. 
 
                                                 
28 HUSKY costs include imputed premiums for each income band assuming the average premium cost for 
HUSKY B for enrollees with household income >300% FPL and the per child monthly premium of $30 for 
household income at 235-300% FPL.  SAGA and other Medicaid per enrollee costs were much higher and 
excluded because they represent the high health utilization of special needs groups.  All costs and 
enrollments were supplied by Connecticut OPM 2004/05 FY projections and matched with 3-year historical 
averages.  
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Medicaid Expansion: Results 
  CCEA estimates 13,303 newly eligible persons enroll in Connecticut’s Medicaid 
expanded program and 11,374 of them are newly insured.  The cost associated with this 
change in enrollment is $4.8 for the federal government and $25.7 million for the state 
government.  
 
















1 Current SAGA enrollees not included in estimates.    
2 These costs do not include the cost Medicaid and Expanded Medicaid for Children.  For details on the  
   cost ‘swap’ between the federal government and state see text below.   
 
In addition, Senator Kerry proposes to ease enrollment burdens by automatically 
enrolling eligible children in schools and clinics.  Kerry would remove the five-year 
eligibility-waiting period for legal immigrants.  That would increase the number of 
eligible particularly in Connecticut’s Hispanic community.  Also, the HUSKY plan has 
become increasing popular and well-known in Connecticut.  Expanding the HUSKY 
program, would likely reach out to more individuals than in the past.  For these reasons, 
the CCEA enrollment estimates are conservative.  
 The Kerry plan proposes $5 billion in bonuses for states that enroll 90%-95% of 
eligible children, although he does not specify how these funds would be distributed.  
CCEA estimates Connecticut would need $109 to $115.1 million to insure 90% to 95% 
of the 53,065 uninsured Medicaid-eligible children in Connecticut under the existing 
HUSKY programs.  The government would need to spend $108.7 to $114.7 million and 
enrolled households altogether would pay $351,000 to $371,000 in shared premiums.  
Households would also pay out-of-pocket charges such as health service co-payments 
that are not included in this estimate.  In addition to program costs, Connecticut would 
need to engage in outreach and enrollment activities, which would require additional 
resources.   
In order to remain cost-neutral in such an expansion, Connecticut would need to 
receive at least $109 to $115.1 million from government.  Given that all states would  
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share in the proposed bonuses, the Kerry bonuses likely fall short of fully funding the 
expansion.   
  In addition to the bonuses, however, the Kerry plan proposes to provide fiscal 
relief to participating states by assuming the state costs of children enrolled in HUSKY 
A.  This funding ‘swap’ would transfer an estimated $258.8 million to Connecticut.  The 
net cost of the swap and the expansion would be a savings of $232.9 million for 
Connecticut.  These savings could be applied to increasing enrollment among the number 
of eligible but uninsured children in Connecticut.  The net cost of the swap and the 
expansion to the federal government would be $263.3 million for Connecticut.         
  Kerry’s proposed expansion is designed to reach those in poverty; however, it 
affects minority groups differentially.  Thirty-one percent of Hispanics and 24% of 
African-Americans in Connecticut live in poverty (Kaiser, 2004).
29  These statistics 
suggest that this program has the potential to help minorities in poverty gain health 
insurance.  However, research suggests that obstacles to enrolling minority households go 
beyond expanding eligibility (CCEA, 2004).  Concerns about immigration status and 
language barriers reduce Hispanic enrollment.  Experience also suggests that outreach 
and targeted advertising is important for increasing enrollment in these populations 
(CSRA, 2000). 
 
IV. Tax Credits 
  The Kerry plan offers refundable tax credits
30 to three distinct populations 
purchasing non-group insurance:   
•  a 75% tax credit for up to six months for unemployed with household incomes 
below 300% of poverty; 
•  a 25% tax credit to 55-64 year olds with household incomes below 300% of 
poverty; and 
•  a credit
31 for health insurance expenditures above a cap of 6% of household 
income for households in poverty, up to 12% of household income for households 
at 300% of poverty.
32 
                                                 
29 This contrasts with only 6% of Caucasian, non-Hispanic persons living in poverty.   
30 Based on current information, it is not clear whether these tax rebates would be available at the time of 
purchase.  Low-income households paying for insurance first and receiving a credit later poses a liquidity 
challenge and could reduce the number who participate 
31 Details are not available on how the proposed health insurance expenditure cap would be administered.  
CCEA assumes it would be administered as a refundable tax credit.  
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All individuals eligible for these credits would be eligible to purchase non-group 
insurance through the proposed Congressional Health Plan.  Modeled on the current 
federal employees’ health benefit plan, the Congressional Health Plan reduces health 
insurance premiums by promoting competition between insurers and spreading risk and 
administrative costs over a broader population.  This last point is especially important in 
the non-group market.    
 
Tax Credit Discussion 
Based on federal employees’ health benefit premiums, CCEA estimates 
Congressional Health Plan premiums would be 1.5% to 10% less than the current average 
employer-based Connecticut premium.  Buchmueller and Ohri (2004) estimate that 55-64 
year olds would expect a 10% decrease in premiums if they paid an actuarially fair 
premium.  An actuarially fair premium reflects the risk of medical costs of a given 
population.  For specific sub-groups, being part of a lower-risk insurance pool may 
increase savings further.  Johnson, et al. (1999) estimate that health status differences in 
the non-group market can increase the price of premiums 50% for 55-61 year olds with 
mild to moderate health conditions and 200% for those with serious conditions.  Based on 
these estimates, CCEA assumes premiums would fall by 10% rather than the more 
conservative 1.5% for those purchasing ‘non-group’ insurance from the Congressional 
Health Plan. 
Even with lower premiums and a tax credit, the cost of health insurance premiums 
for a comprehensive care policy may still be too large.  For instance, a single person with 
income 300% of poverty, or $28,719, would pay $3,365 for insurance in the current 
federal employees’ health benefit plan.  This premium represents 11.7% of their income.  
Even with Kerry’s health expenditure cap, spending 6% to 12% of one’s income on 
premiums alone is a significant burden to many low-to-moderate income households. 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 These credits are in addition to current tax-credits that allow the self-employed to deduct up to 100% of 
their premium payment up to their self-employment income amount and to some extent supplement other 
tax exemptions including itemized deductions for medical spending (including health insurance premiums) 
above 7.5% of their adjusted gross income (AGI).   
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The tax credits’ effectiveness at decreasing the number of uninsured may be 
diminished by two factors.  First, to the extent that government subsidizes non-group 
insurance, firms may reduce the share of premiums they pay or the amount of coverage 
they offer their employees to reduce the firm’s insurance costs (Gruber, 2000).  The 
CCEA analysis below follows Gruber’s (2000) micro-simulation model in incorporating 
the effects of changes in the non-group market on the other insurance sectors.  A second 
issue with tax credits is that they serve to decrease the costs of those already purchasing 
non-group insurance rather than increasing the number of newly insured (Marquis and 
Long, 1995 and Johnson, et al., 1999).  Tax credits for non-group insurance premiums are 
potentially expensive programs that may do little to increase the number of newly 
insured.  
The sections below detail the impact of each of the Kerry plan’s tax proposals. 
 
IV.I  Tax Credit for Unemployed Workers: Model Specification 
  A total of 41,300 Connecticut residents are eligible for this tax credit (CPS, 2002-
04).  They are unemployed, are aged 19-64 and have incomes less than 300% of poverty.  
CCEA assumes individuals in this group eligible for the Medicaid expansion will first 
choose the Medicaid expansion.  Unemployed individuals who are also eligible for the 
55-64 year old tax credit will claim the unemployed tax credit first because it is larger.  
This leaves a ‘net’ eligible population of 22,430 in Connecticut.  Of these, 6,012 purchase 
health insurance through their previous employer under the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).  Under COBRA, unemployed workers keep their 
employer-based insurance when separating from a job but pay the full premium 
themselves. 
  Individuals switching to the Congressional Health Plan pay 10% less for 
premiums than they would pay in the non-group market.  CCEA assumes that COBRA-
eligible individuals choose to continue their employer-coverage to avoid transition delays 
and costs.  COBRA-eligible individuals can apply the tax credit to their employer 
policies.  The 75% tax credit for six months is a 37.5% tax credit on annual premiums.
33  
                                                 
33 CCEA considered the potential that insureds were uninsured less than six months and the relevant price 
reduction was 75%.  For the scenario presented here, CCEA pessimistically assumes that individuals expect  
26 
  Estimates of price elasticities for insurance purchases range from a low of -0.03 
for individuals purchasing group insurance with premium cost sharing (Chernew, et al., 
1997, Blumberg, et al., 2001) to a high of -0.685 for the self-employed’s purchase of non-
group insurance (Gruber and Porterba, 1994).  Marquis and Long (1995) estimate a price 
elasticity between -0.3 to -0.4 workers purchasing non-group insurance.  Gruber and 
Madrian (1997) studied the decision to purchase health insurance by unemployed men 
aged 25-54.  They found a price elasticity of -0.1 (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).  For the 
scenario presented below, CCEA follows Gruber (2000) and estimates an income-
adjusted price elasticity ranging from -0.32 for households in poverty to -0.55 for 
households with incomes 300% of poverty.
34 
Based on studies of the earned income tax credit, Gruber (2000) further suggests 
that less than 100% of households purchasing non-group or COBRA insurance actually 
take up the credit.  Not all households are aware of tax credits or how to file for them.  
CCEA assumes that tax credit-eligible individuals increase their take-up rate as the size 
of the tax credit increases.  Following Gruber (2000), take-up rates reach a maximum of 
90% with a 100% tax-credit.  For individuals eligible for the tax credit, who are not 
eligible for Kerry’s Medicaid proposals, but are nevertheless on Medicaid, CCEA 
assumes that a small percentage will prefer to purchase insurance from the Congressional 
Health Plan (Gruber, 2000).  The non-group tax-credits are a new option to these 
individuals and they have slightly higher incomes than those eligible for the Kerry 
Medicaid expansion (up to 300% of poverty).  Furthermore, this assumption is parallel to 
assumptions made about the Bush tax-credits.   
The assumptions for the scenario presented below are:   
•  non-group and newly insured enroll in the Congressional Health Plan and pay 10% 
lower premiums; 
•  COBRA-eligible maintain their employer-based insurance rather than switching 
plans;  
•  the annualized value of the tax credit is 37.5%; 
•  price elasticities range from -0.32 to -0.55 increasing with income; 
•  55% of those with non-group insurance take up the tax credit; and 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘the worst’ or to be unemployed for a year and consider the 37.5% reduction in annual premiums when 
making the decision to purchase insurance.  
34 The income adjusted price elasticity is -0.625(1-(after tax premium/income))
 2.  This elasticity is applied 
to aggregate poverty classes with a weighting for family size.  
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•  57% of those with COBRA insurance take up the tax credit; and 
•  6.8% of Medicaid eligible, not eligible for Kerry’s Medicaid expansion, switch to 
non-group insurance.  
 
Tax Credit for Unemployed Workers: Results 
  In Connecticut, 5,269 people would use the tax credit for the unemployed.  Of 
these, 1,658 would be newly insured.  The cost of the program is modest because of the 
program’s small scope.  The federal cost of the program is $12.6 million and households 
pay an additional $22.1 million for insurance.  There is no direct state liability in this 
program. 
 









Results for Tax Credit 
for Unemployed 
Workers  
5,269 1,658 $22.1 $12.6 
 
When individuals lose their jobs, not only do their incomes decrease, but they 
now must pay the full cost of their insurance.  The COBRA provision has improved 
access to health insurance, but has not made it more affordable.  This tax credit would 
increase the affordability of health insurance for unemployed workers.  If an individual is 
unemployed for less than six months, the tax credit would cover 75% of the costs of 
insurance.  For individuals unemployed longer, the premium represents a smaller share of 
their total spending on health insurance premiums.   
 In addition to affordability, this tax credit also impacts the labor market.  Gruber 
and Madrian (1997) analyzed the changes in employment behavior when COBRA 
programs first introduced affordable health care for unemployed men aged 25-54.  
Gruber and Madrian (1997) found that workers changed their employment behavior when 
they had the option of purchasing health insurance under their employer-based health 
insurance (EBHI) plan for a year.  Workers were unemployed 15% longer and increased 
the rate of job transition by 14%.  The new jobs workers found were 6% better paid than 
their previous job.  These results suggest making health insurance available and 
affordable may decrease ‘job lock’ and ease job transition.  
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IV.I  Tax Credit for 55-64 Year-Olds: Model Specification 
In Connecticut, 91,335 individuals are between 55-64 years old and have 
household incomes below 300% of poverty.  Of these 55-64 year olds, 21,687 are netted 
out because they are eligible for other Kerry proposals.  These ‘near-elderly’ are more 
likely to face higher medical costs because health status worsens with age.  In addition, 
they are less connected to the labor force.  Many 55-64 year olds retire early, either by 
choice or because they cannot find employment.  Consequently, they need health 
insurance options beyond employer-based coverage.   
Under this proposal, 55-64 year olds would be eligible to purchase non-group 
insurance from the Congressional Health Plan.  As discussed above, this results in an 
assumed 10% reduction in non-group premiums.  The refundable tax credit further 
reduces premium costs by 25%. 
As discussed in the previous section, price elasticities to purchase insurance range 
from the Chernew, et al. (1997) low estimate of -0.03 and Gruber and Porterba’s (1994) 
estimate of -0.685.  Buchmueller and Ohri (2004) estimate an overall price elasticity of 
-0.152 for 55-64 year olds based on a survey of retirees paying the full health insurance 
premium.  Although these price elasticities were used in background analyses, the 
scenario presented below uses income-adjusted price elasticities based on Gruber (2000) 
for consistency with the other tax credit results.  CCEA assumes a price elasticity of -0.21 
for households with poverty level incomes, -0.43 for households with income at 200% of 
poverty and -0.47 for households at 300% of poverty.  To the extent these elasticities are 
greater than the Buchmueller and Ohri (2004) estimates, CCEA’s results represent an 
overstatement of the number of enrollees.  
  Individuals currently insured with non-group insurance take up subsidies 
depending on the size of the credit.  Following Gruber (2000), CCEA assumes a 50% 
take-up rate among those currently purchasing non-group insurance at a 25% credit.  The 
take-up rate scales up with the credit to a maximum of a 90% take-up rate for a 100% 
credit.   
Those with employer-based health insurance may switch to non-group insurance 
if their employer reduces its coverage in response to this credit.  Health insurance is a  
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costly employee benefit for employers.  If other alternatives are available to their 
workers, employers may try to shift some or all of their costs of insurance onto their 
employees (Cutler and Gruber, 1995).  The scenario presented below accounts for this 
possibility based on the micro-simulation tax credit model Gruber (2000) developed.  
This model assumes 10% of firms drop coverage if a 100% credit is available, with a 
sliding scale based on credit size.  If firms drop coverage, these newly uninsured workers 
then purchase non-group health insurance if it is cheaper than their employee portion of 
their employer-based health insurance or, if not cheaper, according to an income-adjusted 
price elasticity.  Based on Gruber (2000), CCEA assumes that no firms increase premium 
cost sharing in response to this tax credit.   
The Gruber (2000) model assumes that some individuals take advantage of the 
Kerry plan tax credit as an opportunity to switch from Medicaid to non-group insurance.  
Only those enrolled in Medicaid, but not eligible for the Kerry Medicaid expansion are 
part of the population eligible to make this switch.  As above, these individuals are 
wealthier than the average person affected by the Medicaid expansion is and the 
Congressional Health Plan and tax credits are a new opportunity for them.  CCEA 
assumes 4.5% of Medicaid recipients switch to non-group health insurance with the 10% 
cost reduction and 25% tax credit.  
  CCEA estimates the following scenario for the ‘near-elderly’ tax credit 
•  10% lower premiums in the Congressional Health Plan; 
•  25% refundable tax credit;   
•  50% of current non-group insured enroll in the Congressional Health Plan and claim 
the tax credit;   
•  uninsured individuals purchase insurance based on price elasticities ranging from 
-0.21 for households with incomes in poverty to -0.47 for households with incomes 
at 300% of poverty; 
•  employees at 2.5% of firms that drop insurance purchase insurance on this same 
basis; and  
•  4.5% of Medicaid enrollees switch to non-group insurance.   
 
Kerry Tax Credit for 55-64 Year-Olds: Results 
  CCEA estimates 5,537 ‘near-elderly’ people in Connecticut would enroll in the 
Congressional Health Plan and take-up the tax credit.  These enrollees represent 8% of 
Connecticut’s net eligible population.  Only 732 individuals gain insurance under this  
30 
plan.  This figure is low, in part, because some firms reduce coverage in response to the 
government program.
35  The federal cost for these enrollees is $8.4 million with 
households absorbing $25.1 million in health insurance premium costs. There is no direct 
state liability in this program.  In this case, the majority of the costs of the program 
accrue to people already insured. 
 









Results for Tax Credit 
for 55-64 Year Olds  
5,537 732 $25.1 $8.4 
 
This tax credit could potentially increase the number of early retirees.  The closer 
an individual is to retirement age; the less likely they are to stay in the labor force.  
However, the lack of affordable health insurance options keeps individuals working past 
when they would like to retire.  Several studies found that the availability of non-group 
insurance increases the rate of early retirement for 55-64 year olds (Johnson, et al., 1999, 
Gruber and Madrian, 1995, Blau and Gilleski, 1997).
36  For instance, Gruber and Madrian 
(1995) found a 1.1% increase in the number of early retirees based on the availability of 
COBRA insurance.  Buchmueller and Ohri (2004) have a similar finding.  With the 
availability of a tax credit and health insurance through the Congressional Health Plan, 
more Connecticut residents would have insurance and some will retire early.   
 
                                                 
35 These assumptions are consistent with the other tax credit analyses for the Bush and Kerry plans.  
36 In contrast, Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) look at average medical costs and find no propensity for 
individuals to retire early.   
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IV.3   Health Insurance Expense Cap  
  The Kerry plan also proposes allowing individuals not covered by his other plans, 
to buy into the Congressional Health Plan.  The amount of income spent on health 
insurance would be capped at 6% for those in poverty.  The cap would phase out at 
incomes of 300% of poverty with an expenditure cap of 12% of income.  CCEA assumes 
Kerry would offer a refundable tax credit for health insurance premium costs above these 
caps.
37   
To be eligible for this credit, one must not be eligible for any other program.  
Based on this, CCEA excludes individuals eligible for employer-based health insurance, 
Medicaid, Medicare, and other government programs (Indian Health Service, TRICARE, 
CHAMPVA, etc.) who are 55-64 and unemployed.  These criteria leave out individuals 
working or not in the labor force, 19-54 who are uninsured or currently buying non-group 
insurance with household incomes between 100% and 300% of poverty (excluding 
parents with household incomes from 100% to 200% of poverty).  Enforcing these 
eligibility requirements presents a challenge to administering the program.  The Kerry 
plan does not specify how this would be accomplished (Kerry and Edwards, 2004a, 
2004b).  For this analysis, CCEA assumes the eligible population is targeted accurately.       
  The actual size of the credit is highly sensitive to the size health insurance 
premium.  CCEA assumes the premiums are comparable to the 2004 federal employees’ 
health benefit premiums for comprehensive plans in Connecticut.
38  CCEA estimates the 
average value of the cap is 40% for households at 100% of poverty, 21% for households 
at 200% of poverty and 7% for households at 300% of poverty as weighted by average 
household size.  In the absence of additional information, CCEA assumes the cap is a tax 
rebate received at the time of insurance purchase (Kerry and Edwards, 2004a, 2004b).   
 
                                                 
37 Although not reported here, the CCEA also considered the combined effect of income caps with the other 
tax credits on the number of insured.   
38 CCEA imputes a ‘single-plus one’ premium for the congressional health plan that is 10% less than 
current projected Connecticut employer-based health insurance premiums.   
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Health Insurance Expense Cap: Model Specification    
  A total of 174,357 Connecticut residents are eligible for this and no other Kerry 
program.  This population includes people working, not in the labor force, uninsured and 
non-group insured with incomes between the poverty line and 300% of poverty.  Of the 
population eligible for the Kerry tax credit, 55% are currently uninsured and 45% have 
non-group insurance. 
CCEA estimates the Congressional Health Plan premiums will be 10% less 
expensive than current non-group policies’ premiums.
39  For the population CCEA 
considers, total savings are between 31% and 17% with Congressional Health Plan 
premiums and the income caps. 
Although CCEA considered a range of price responses (elasticities) from -0.1 to   
-0.625, the scenario presented below assumes an income-adjusted price elasticity ranging 
from -0.38 to -0.42 based on Gruber (2000).
40  This is consistent with the other tax credit 
analyses.   
Because individuals with employer-based health insurance are not eligible for the 
Kerry tax credit, CCEA assumes no behavioral change on the part of firms.  In fact, 
because CCEA assumes the government is able to target accurately the specified 
population, there are no employer-based health insurance or government program 
switches.  Individuals with non-group insurance have take-up rates ranging from a high 
of 48% for households with incomes 100-200% of poverty to 41% for households with 
200-300% of poverty (Gruber, 2000).   
The assumptions used in the scenario below are: 
•  10% reduction in insurance premiums from the Congressional Health Plan; 
•  21% cap ‘rebate’ for households with incomes 100%-200% of poverty and 7% cap 
‘rebate’ for households with incomes 200%-300% of poverty;  
•  price elasticities of -0.38 for households with incomes 100%-200% of poverty and 
-0.42 for households with incomes 200%-300% of poverty; and 
•  48% take-up rate for households purchasing non-group insurance and incomes 100%-
200% of poverty and 41% for households with incomes 200%-300% of poverty. 
 
                                                 
39 These numbers are based on Connecticut average premiums reported in the insurance component of the 
MEPS.  Non-group insurance premiums are likely to be higher and therefore 10% represents a conservative 
estimate.   
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Health Insurance Expense Cap: Results 
This policy serves a broad portion of Connecticut’s population.  Even so, only 
43,914 enroll of which 9,186 are newly insured in Connecticut.  The caps still require 
households to spend a significant portion (between 6% and 12%) of their income on 
health insurance premiums.  Given the other demands on a Connecticut resident’s 
income, many individuals still cannot afford to purchase non-group insurance.  This 
credit mostly reduces health insurances costs for those who already purchase non-group 
insurance. 
  









Results for Health 
Insurance Expense Cap  
43,914 9,186 $226.8 $38.6 
 
  The federal cost of this program is $38.6 million.  This represents about 14.5% of 
the total health insurance premium costs.  Households pay the remaining $226.8 million 
in insurance costs. 
 
Summary of Kerry Analysis 
The Kerry plan represents a significant investment in expanding the current system.  
Under the Kerry plan, employer-based health insurance, Medicaid and non-group 
insurance all expand.  Even so, the high cost of health insurance premiums means 
insurance would still be unaffordable to many members of Connecticut society.  A total 
of 181,936 Connecticut residents gain insurance under these proposals.  This reduces the 
number of uninsured by 50%.  Another 175,064 Connecticut residents would still be 
without health insurance.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 The income adjusted price elasticity is: -0.625(1-(after tax premium/income))
 2.  This elasticity is applied 
to aggregate poverty classes with a weighting for family size.  
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Cost Savings 
This report considers two Kerry proposals to reduce the cost of health care.  
CCEA selected these policies for analysis because they are within the purview of health 
insurance reforms.  The Kerry plan requires employers in his Stop-Loss Reimbursement 
Plan to encourage disease management programs.  His plan expands current disease 
management initiatives in Medicaid and Medicare at the national level.  The Kerry plan 
proposes to provide ‘incentives’ to switch the current health insurance claims system 
from a paper system to an electronic system.
41  Under both plans, the number of 
uninsured would decline.  This means that uncompensated care would be reduced.  
CCEA estimates this change for both candidates assuming fewer uninsured would reduce 
federal and state disproportionate share payments.  This section quantifies the potential 
health and cost impact of these changes. 
 
I. Disease  Management 
Nationally, 10% of all patients incur 70% of all health care costs (Short, et al., 
2003).  Many of these patients have chronic or multiple health conditions (CBO, 2002).  
For instance, of the national adult Medicaid population, 60% have a chronic or disabling 
condition and 50% of those have more than one chronic condition (Williams, 2004).  
Disease management programs assume that if chronically ill individuals receive timely 
and appropriate care, much of this expense could be averted, in particular, expensive 
hospitalizations and emergency room visits.  Some of the most common diseases that are 
targeted for management are asthma, diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), end-stage renal disease (ESRD), depression, 
rheumatoid arthritis, chronic pain, hypertension and hyperlipidema (Ofman, et al., 2004).  
Disease management strategies target individuals with these conditions to avoid costly 
care by keeping them well.   
According to Short, et al. (2003), disease management strategies include “sending 
patients educational materials about their condition, reminding them to adhere to 
prescribed medications or seek preventive screenings” (page 2).  Disease management  
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programs may include similar reminders to physicians regarding their patients.  A more 
intensive step may be case management that focuses on coordinating care in highly 
individualized treatment programs.  Hospitals and providers also have rigorous protocols 
for managing disease.  The programs have in common the implementation best practice 
treatment for chronic conditions.  The depth and extent of the programs varies 
considerably.   
A recent literature review of all types of disease management programs by 
Orfman, et al. (2004) found that disease management improved health outcomes in many 
cases but failed to realize uniform cost savings.  Other researchers have expressed 
skepticism about the potential cost savings of disease management programs (Kazel, 
2003, Short, et al., 2003, Harris, 1996, and Williams, 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Both Kerry and Bush have proposed other information technology changes such as electronic medical 
records to reduce medical error.  The potential savings from reduced medical errors are currently 
hypothetical and, therefore, other initiatives are excluded from analysis.    
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Disease Management: Method 
To estimate the potential savings of disease management strategies, CCEA 
considers only the impact of disease management on federal programs.  The federal 
government has the authority to mandate the implementation of disease management in 
Medicaid and the expansion of disease management in Medicare.  The Kerry stop-loss 
reinsurance pool program could lead to the expansion of disease management in the 
general population that would reduce statewide health care expenditures.  Participation in 
the stop-loss reinsurance pool is voluntary and the type of programs and the extent of the 
programs is unclear.  Conservatively, CCEA focuses exclusively on Medicaid and 
Medicare savings. 
Medicare and Medicaid recipients both have scope for cost reduction through 
disease management.  Compared to the general population Medicare and Medicaid 
recipients are more likely to have chronic diseases because they are older or more likely 
to be ‘low-income’ if they are sick.  Further, some Medicaid recipients do not have a 
consistent relationship with their health care provider and are prone to avoidable adverse 
health outcomes.  This opens a window for potential cost savings through disease 
management programs. 
CCEA’s literature review found savings ranging from 7% for disease 
management of bladder infections (Armstrong, 2001) to 53% for diabetics with ESRD 
(Gozzoli, et al., 2001).  Lazarus (2001) predicted a potential overall savings of as much 
as 33% with broad-based disease management based on analytic modeling.  For ‘low-
income’ individuals (on Medicaid), Rossiter, et al. (2000) found a $3 to $4 cost savings 
for each incremental dollar spent on disease management.  Thorpe (2004a) cites a recent 
compilation of studies from America’s Health Insurance Plans that suggests a range from 
6% to 33% cost savings for specific disease management plans.  Overall, Thorpe (2004a) 
estimates a potential 10% decline in medical expenditures for those with chronic 
diseases, which is about 30% of Medicare recipients. 
State-level disease management initiatives have met with mixed success in their 
Medicaid programs.  Colorado found an overall 11% cost reduction in their Medicaid 
asthma disease management program (Williams, 2004).  The State of Washington 
realized a combined savings of $2 million (or 5% of costs) for asthma, diabetes,  
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congestive heart failure and end-stage renal disease.  Florida projected savings of $112.7 
million over four years for its Medicaid disease management program covering nine 
diseases (Williams, 2004).
42  However, it is not clear that these savings were realized 
(Williams, 2004).  Several state-level programs are in the process of implementation and 
have not yet been evaluated (Williams, 2004). 
  CCEA develops two savings scenarios for disease management.  Scenario one is 
based on Florida’s Medicaid program.  Under this scenario, CCEA estimates a 0.45% 
saving in Connecticut’s Medicaid and Medicare programs.  Based on Thorpe’s (2004) 
analysis, CCEA estimates health care costs will decline by 10% for 30% of current 
Medicare expenditures.  This rate translates to a savings of 1.6% for all Medicare 
expenditures.  CCEA applies this rate (1.6%) to estimate disease management savings for 
both Medicaid and Medicare.  Federal and state government share savings accruing to the 
Medicaid program based on the regular and enhanced Medicaid reimbursement rate.  
CCEA notes the possibility that no cost savings will be realized through the implemented 
disease management programs, particularly in the first few years of the programs 
 
Disease Management: Results 
CCEA finds a potential savings of $39.1 million in scenario one and $141.7 
million in scenario two.  Of these amounts, between $30.3 and $109.9 million accrues to 
the federal government and between $8.8 and $31.8 million accrues to the Connecticut 
state government.  Table 12 below presents these results.  CCEA selects the conservative 
scenario, scenario one, as the ‘most probable’ scenario.  The conservative scenario is 
most prudent given that government programs have as of yet failed to demonstrate 
appreciable cost savings.   
                                                 
42 Both Florida and Washington mandated 5% and 6% cost savings, respectively for their programs (Carrol, 
2004, LifeMasters, 2004).  In this case, the disease management firms are required to produce this level of 
savings or pay the difference.  
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Table 12:  Disease Management Savings (million) 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Total Program Expenditures
1  $8,703 $8,703 
Net Savings  $39.1  $141.7 
Federal Net Savings  $30.3  $109.9 
State Net Savings  $8.8  $31.8 
1 Based on Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services data.  State expenditures are extrapolated to 2004 
levels based on using national spending trends until 2002 and a conservative 6% rate of growth to 2004. 
 
  The potential impact of disease management programs, however, goes beyond 
cost savings.  While some researchers question disease management cost savings (Kazel, 
2003, Short, et al., 2003, Harris, 1996), most studies find improved health outcomes in 
the target population (Ofman, et al., 2004).  For Medicaid-eligible individuals with 
chronic and unstable health conditions, disease management could provide a significant 
improvement in quality of life.  Improving health outcomes increases the potential for 
worker productivity and, consequently, higher incomes.    
 
II  Information Technology (IT)  
  Integrating information technologies into the current claims system could reduce 
health insurance costs.  The Kerry plan proposes replacing the current mixed paper and 
electronic health insurance claim system with a 100% electronic claims adjustment 
system.  Kerry proposes offering incentives to convince health care providers to switch to 
an electronic system but provides little detail on these incentives.  The Kerry plan  
proposes integrating information technology systems in other areas such as prescribing 
medicines and storing patient information.  These initiatives are designed to reduce 
medical errors and are shared in common, to some extent with proposals from President 
Bush.    
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Information Technology: Method 
CCEA considers only potential changes to the insurance system.  The potential 
implementation costs are not considered because details of the plans for ‘bonuses’, tax 
credits and the extent of changes are not available.  The CCEA estimates provide a basis 
for considering the potential once all changes have been implemented.  Other information 
technology cost savings are highly uncertain as are the specific time frames and 
proposals.   
Nationally, about 60-70% of medical claims are currently filed electronically 
(Thorpe, 2004).  CCEA considers moving to a 100% electronic system.  We use two 
methods, one Thorpe (2004) developed and another New Jersey Institute of Technology 
(NJIT, 1995) developed to compare the potential savings for Connecticut.   
  Scenario one is based on Thorpe (2004) in which he estimates the potential 
savings is $5.50 or 92% per claim filed electronically.  Under this scenario, CCEA 
assumes 35% of total claims are converted from paper to electronic filing.   
Scenario two is based on a study by the New Jersey Institute of Technology 
(NJIT, 1995).  NJIT (1995) finds 41% of claims are filed electronically while the 
remainder is paper claims.  On average, the NJIT (1995) study estimated a 30% cost 
savings per claim filed electronically.   
In scenario two, CCEA assumes a 30% cost saving for 59% of claims.  Although 
the estimate of total claims filed on paper is high, the savings per claim is more 
reasonable than Thorpe’s estimate.  This difference likely reflects the difference between 
savings in theory and savings in practice.  Consequently, scenario two is CCEA’s ‘most 
probable’ estimate of savings from claims switched from paper to electronic filing.    
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Information Technology: Results 
 Connecticut  residents  file an estimated 31,636,837 health care claims per year 
(MEPS, 2002).  CCEA’s methodology finds a range of savings between $24.2 million to 
$60.9 million.  Table 13 reports these results. 
 
Table 12:  Information Technology Cost Savings (millions) 
  Scenario One  Scenario Two 
Claims Newly Filed Electronically  11,072,893 18,665,734
Total Savings
  $60.9 $24.2
    Federal Savings  $18.3 $7.3
    State Savings  $4.5 $2.0
 
  Using IT as a basis for claims adjustment saves Connecticut insurers and 
providers time and money.  This analysis does not weigh these cost savings against the 
cost of implementing the policies, which would reduce net savings as the program is 
implemented.  The federal and state savings are imputed based on the percentage of 
expenditures that go to the Medicaid and Medicare programs as these are the largest 
components of federal healthcare spending.  The savings imputed to the federal 
government are $7.3 million in our most conservative scenario, Scenario two.  States can 
expect to save about $2 million from this transition. 
 
III.  Disproportionate Share Savings 
  The disproportionate share program developed initially because some providers 
(hospitals, physicians, clinics, etc.) served a disproportionately large share of Medicaid 
and Medicare patients.  Because the reimbursement rates are lower than private insurance 
or out-of-pocket payments, these health care providers were financially disadvantaged in 
treating so many government aid recipients.  Disproportionate share payments were made 
to these providers to compensate them for this disparity.  
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As the number of uninsured nationally and in Connecticut rose, providers treating 
low-income patients faced an additional problem of the uninsured who were unable to 
pay the full cost of their care.  Some uninsured pay discounted health care prices or may 
default on their medical bills.  This leads to a significant level of uncompensated care in 
the state.  Connecticut hospitals alone provided $153.6 million in uncompensated care in 
2002.  Disproportionate share payments have expanded to include the problems of 
uncompensated care.   
Both plans, in total, reduce the number of uninsured.  CCEA finds the Kerry plan 
reduces the number of Connecticut uninsured by 51% and Bush by 3.2%.  Connecticut’s 
disproportionate share payments to health care providers are $115.2 (excluding SAGA 
payments) paid equally by the federal and state government.  Given the differences in 
compensation rates between those with Medicaid and those receive charity or cannot pay, 
a reasonable approximation of payment reductions is an overall reduction proportional to 
the decrease in uninsured.  Table 13 presents the results below. 
 
Table 13: Disproportionate Share Savings (millions) 




Total Disproportionate Share 
Payments Savings 
  $7.2 $58.7 
Federal Disproportionate Share 
Payments Savings 
$3.6 $29.4 




  The two plans exhibit modest savings for the state and federal government related 
to the reduction in the number of uninsured.  Savings would also accrue to health care 
providers to the extent that they have a reduction in the administrative costs associated 
with uncompensated care and their share of the uncompensated care costs.  The Kerry 
plan reduces disproportionate share payments the most because it increases the insurance 
rates.    
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Table 14:  Current Federal Poverty Guidelines by Household Size and Age 
   Weighted Related children under 18 years 
    Size of family unit  average                 Eight
   thresholds None One Two Three Four Five Six Seven or more
One person (unrelated individual).……       9,393                             
  Under 65 years....................…………       9,573        9,573                             
  65 years and over.................………       8,825        8,825                          
                                
Two persons.........................……………     12,015                             
  Householder under 65 years........…      12,384       12,321       12,682                       
  Householder 65 years and over...…      11,133       11,122       12,634                       
                                
Three persons.......................………      14,680       14,393       14,810       14,824                     
Four persons........................……….      18,810       18,979       19,289       18,660     18,725                 
Five 
persons........................………………      22,245       22,887       23,220       22,509     21,959       21,623              
Six persons.........................……………      25,122       26,324       26,429       25,884     25,362       24,586       24,126           
Seven persons.......................…………      28,544       30,289       30,479       29,827     29,372       28,526       27,538       26,454      
Eight persons......…….      31,589       33,876       34,175       33,560     33,021       32,256       31,286       30,275     30,019     
Nine persons or more...……….      37,656       40,751       40,948       40,404     39,947       39,196       38,163       37,229     36,998       35,572   
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Glossary: 
Adverse Selection:  The process by which premiums rise for one type of insurance when 
healthier than average policy-holders leave to purchase another type of insurance, leaving 
the remaining pool in the original insurance group on average less healthy and therefore 
more costly to insure. 
Children:  A child is a person younger than 19 years of age. 
Federal Poverty Line Guidelines:  The U.S. Census Bureau defines the level of income 
needed to meet the basic needs of households depending on size.  The ‘needs’ of 
households are based on U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates of food budgets 
required for families under stress.  These guidelines were initially developed in 1964-5 
and the current price index has been used to update these values.  Families with less 
income than these poverty thresholds are considered in poverty.  See 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/povdef.html, and 
http://www.dss.state.ct.us/pubs/AnnualReport2003.pdf. 
Childless adults – Single or married adults who do not have a child under the age of 19. 
Current Population Survey (CPS) – The Current Population Survey is a monthly U.S. 
Census bureau household survey.  The March Supplement is the Annual Social and 
Economic Survey (ASEC) is the basis for the health insurance data.  
EBHI: employer-based health insurance 
Elasticity – A measure of responsiveness of the percentage change of one factor with 
respect to the percentage change in another.  A price elasticity measures the percentage 
change in quantity for a given change in price. 
Establishments – Establishments are units of a firm that are established in different 
geographical locations. 
Federal Poverty Line Guidelines:  The U.S. Census Bureau defines the level of income 
needed to meet the basic needs of households depending on size.  The ‘needs’ of 
households are based on U.S. Department of Agricultures estimates of food budgets 
required for families under stress.  These guidelines were initially developed in 1964-5 
and the current price index has been used to update these values.  Families with less than 
income than these poverty thresholds are in poverty.   
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/povdef.html  
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Federal Employee Health Benefit Program (FEHB)  A national program that provides 
health insurance plan options to federal employees.  
Firms- Firms represent entire business unit for tax purposes.  A firm may consist of 
several geographically independent establishments. 
Health Savings Account (HSA) A regulated tax-free savings account supported by 
workers or their employers that can be used to pay for medical care.   
Job-Lock: this term means that employees are not willing to change jobs because of non-
portability of their health insurance package. 
Parents – Parents are adults who are the legal parents of and reside with dependent 
children younger than 19. 
Unemployed: refers to people who are not working for the last 12 months, people who 
are not working for more than 12 months and people who never worked.  
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